The True, Hidden Origin of the So-Called “Hard Problem of Consciousness”

Philosophers of mind talk a lot about the so-called “hard problem of consciousness.” But is this a real, objective problem to solve, or just a subjective reflection of a confused way of thinking? And in the latter case, where and how exactly does the problem arise? In this essay, you will be amazed at how obvious and peculiar the error of thought is at the heart of a complex problem, and amazed that so many otherwise smart, educated people can regard the whole matter as something of a mystery. The essay is a fragment of my up-to-date book entitled Analytical idealism in a nutshellwhich will be released at the end of October 2024.

To understand why physicalism fails to explain experience, note that there is nothing about physical parameters – i.e. quantities and their abstract relationships, defined e.g. by mathematical equations – in terms from which we can in principle deduce the features of experience. Even if neuroscientists knew the minutiae of the topology, network structure, electrical charge and timing, etc. of my visual cortex, they would be essentially unable to deduce the empirical features of what I see. This is the so-called “hard problem of consciousness”, which is talked about a lot in philosophy.

It is critical to understand this claim correctly. We know empirically about many correlations between measurable patterns of brain activity and internal experience. Therefore, it is unthreatening to say that in many situations we can correctly guess what experiences a person is having solely based on the patterns of brain activity they have measured.

We were even able to tell what subjects were dreaming about simply by reading their brain states. However, these correlations are purely empirical; that is, we do not know why and how certain specific patterns of brain activity correlate with certain specific internal experiences; we simply know this to be the case as a brute empirical fact.

And if we look at enough of these brutal facts, we will eventually be able to extrapolate and start making good guesses about what people experience based solely on their measured brain states. None of this constitutes an understanding or explanation of what is happening; about how nature supposedly moves from quantitative brain states to qualitative experiential states. These brutal facts are just empirical observations, not explanations of anything. We do not owe the brutal facts to any theory or metaphysics, because they are observations, not reports. Physicalism does not attribute brute facts.

This is not just an abstract theoretical point that I am trying to present here, but a very specific one. We can know empirically that the pattern of brain activity in, say, P₁ correlates with X's internal experience₁but we don't know why₁ occurs in pairs with P₁ instead of Mr₂or p₃P₄P_whatever. For any particular experience of Xn – say, the taste of strawberries – we cannot deduce what pattern of brain activity Pn should be associated with it unless we have already empirically observed this association before and therefore know it only as a brute fact.

This means that there is nothing about Pn, in terms, from which we could in principle deduce Xn, on physicalist grounds. This is a complex problem of consciousness, and in itself is a death blow to mainstream physicalism. This means that physicalism cannot explain any single experience and therefore nothing in the field of human knowledge.

Note that the difficult problem is a fundamental epistemic problem, not merely an operational or contingent one; it cannot be resolved through further research and analysis. There is basically nothing about quantities from which we can in principle deduce characteristics. There is no logical bridge between X millimeters, Y grams or Z milliseconds on the one hand and the sweetness of strawberries, the bitterness of disappointment or the warmth of love on the other; the latter cannot be logically derived from the former.

Structurally, it is possible to move from quality to quantity, because quantities were invented precisely as relative descriptions of qualities; i.e. descriptions of the difference in experience between, for example, carrying 50 kg luggage and 5 kg luggage (the difference in experience is described as 45 kg); driving a car over a distance of 100 km and 1 km (the difference in experience is defined as 99 km); see blue and see red (the empirical difference is described as 750THz – 430THz = 320THz).

However, the meaning of these relative descriptions is anchored in the very features they describe, which thus constitute their semantic reference. In other words, the meaning of “430THz” is the felt quality of seeing red; the meaning of the word “5 kg” is the felt quality of lifting a 5 kg weight (or the felt quality of watching a 5 kg weight fall in a viscous liquid, bounce off an elastic surface, lie on a scale and move a needle, or in any other way) the experience can be describe with 5 kg). Therefore, one cannot start with quantities and try to generate qualities from them, because in this case the semantic reference – i.e. qualities – is supposed to be derived from quantities and can therefore no longer exist prior to them. This strips the quantities of their meaning and makes it impossible to deduce anything from them.

I'll try to explain it with a metaphor. Trying to deduce characteristics from quantities alone is like trying to draw territory from a map. Lines on a map only have meaning if they indicate a territory that predates the map and to which the map refers. But if we try to explain territory in terms of a map, then the territory can no longer pre-exist the map – because now it should somehow arise from the map – and therefore the lines on the map completely lose their meaning; nothing can be deduced from them anymore (that you can make this deduction based on other map-territory pairs you have seen before violates the spirit of the analogy; instead you have to ask yourself whether you could deduce the territory from the map if the map were the first and only thing you have known in your life). This is exactly what the physicalist does when he tries to explain qualities of experience (territory) in terms of physical quantities (maps).

The basic problem is the fundamental lack of a logical bridge connecting quantities with qualities, caused by the abandonment of the semantic reference that initially underpinned the meaning of quantities. The assumptions of mainstream physicalism are that for quantities to matter, qualities must precede them. However, when physicalism tries to explain qualities in terms of quantities, the latter must precede the former and therefore become literally meaningless. Basically, you can't deduce anything from things that don't make sense, and that's the complex problem.

By trying to explain territory with a map, physicalists rob the map of its meaning and become confused when they cannot explain any experience with it. They then promise that one day, when up-to-date, more advanced editions of the map are created, our descendants will be able to reach into the map and draw territory from it; they confuse a fundamental epistemic contradiction with an operational or contingent problem.